duty of metaphysical philosophy is to undertake a careful induction, and "furnish a rigid expression, of the constitutional principles of the mind,

VII. These intuitions guarantee the truths which they reveal. As to what precise truth is revealed and guaranteed by any given intuition, this is to be ascertained by inquiring of the intuition itself. No *a priori* dogmas can be laid down olfe^uch a subject. Tjbere is really no other way of determining what are the truths vouched by the intuitions than by asking them one by one what they have to say. But in thus consulting them, we find that each has one or more truths to utter. These are truths which must be assumed in the first instance. Afterwards attempts might be made to disprove them, (Hamilton's Reid, p. 745); but this has failed. Experience confirms them daily. Going round the intuitions in this way, we should find that perception guarantees the reality of the external object, and sonsciousness of self in a particular state, and causation that when there is a real effect there must likewise be a real cause, and the belief in infinity that there is something infinite. By the union of the intuitions of causation and infinity, we are led to a belief in a Great First Cause, who has power in himself and is infinite.

VIII. It this be a correct scheme of Psychology, we are enabled to see the fundamental errors of the schools of philosophy which have proceeded directly or indirectly from Kant.

(1.) They maintain that in perception and consciousness we know the phenomenal and not the real—qualities but not substance—the external world, not as it is in itself, but merely as an unknown something in its relation to the mind. We hold, in opposition to this, that we cognize individual objects, mental and material, as at once phenomenal and real, as substances exercising qualities, as positive and not relative.

(2.) They maintain, that when the mind contemplates matter, there is something in the subjective idea to which there is nothing corresponding in the objective world To us it appears that the subjective is so constituted, as to be able to know exactly certain qualities in the objective world. It is cognitive, not creative.

(3.) Some of them seem to maintain that, on the occasion of the exercise of the senses, there spring up abstract ideas, such as those of Space and Time, Substance and Quality, Cause and Effect, formed by the Reason or Intelligence. We hold, on the other hand, that intuitively we know individual objects in the concrete. The mind has not an abstract idea of space awakened by the first exercise of the sense of touch—it has merely the knowledge of an object existing in space. The infant does not, upon an event being remembered, immediately entertain an* idea of time—it merely has the knowledge of the event having been before the mind at a previous date. The formation of the abstract ideas of space and time comes at a later date through the exercise of the faculties of reflection.

(4.) They maintain that the mind is furnished with certain grand principles which it can use consciously and knowingly, and with which it may set out in *a priori* speculation. We admit that the mind in all its actions proceeds on intuitive

and fundamental principles, but we maintain that it employs these spontaneously and unconsciously, without directly knowing what the principles are. In order to know what the principles are, we need to observe and classify the cognitions springing up, or the judgments pronounced, and these are all individual. Hence the futility of the *a priori* method of speculation—hence the need of Induction, in order to arrive at the knowledge of Intuitive Principles, which operate, it is true, independently of all experience, but cannot become known to us, or be employed as philosophic principles, till we have determined their nature, rule, and limits, by careful observation.